me being different

I heard this week that Wal-Mart made a big change to their DEI orientation, and found myself once again at odds with what most people seem to be thinking.

These changes are summarized by NPR as “sweeping and include everything from not renewing a five-year commitment for an equity racial center set up in 2020 after the police killing of George Floyd, to pulling out of a prominent gay rights index.” Setting aside for the moment whether inclusion is a good thing, the two points I found interesting: a racial equity center and a prominent gay rights index. So I began thinking again: when did DEI become a cover term for both race and sexual identity?

I recall as early as 1990 people asserting that homosexuality deserved the same protections as race, when it comes to civil rights. But I don’t recall ever hearing any public discourse actually asking the question. Today I find myself faced with a personal and professional problem (in another domain) that leads me again to ask: when should being different be discouraged or punished (in whatever way), and when should it be protected, respected, or valued (in whatever way)?

I think one major deciding factor is whether the difference has a moral value. That is, is there anything objectively good about one side of the difference, or bad about the other? I say objectively here, because I think often people feel that their own side is better regardless, but that feeling doesn’t help us. Once we ask this question, one major issue in the culture wars of the last several decades becomes clearer: is homosexuality (et al) a moral and social deviance, which causes problems both for the individual and society (as some assert), or is it simply another way of being, which is not wrong in any way (as others assert)?

We get lost in questions about who chooses what, and DNA, etc., but I think those questions are distracting. For instance, I understand we have good evidence that alcoholism is genetic. But I imagine most people would still call it a problem. If you beat your wife because you’re drunk because your drinking is out of control, it doesn’t matter if you meant to, nor if you were predisposed to do that by your genes. So I don’t think the genetic origins of a difference are relevant.

I think another deciding factor is whether there is a power imbalance between the two sides of the difference. That is, in many circles, if you are able to defend yourself, you should not expect others to do that for you. However, in many political structures, minority parties are specifically protected from abuse by the majority. It should not be that might makes right. Power may come from simply being in the majority. But it may also come from physical or military capacity/strength, or from knowledge or technology. This is one of the main arguments for protecting unborn children —they are at the mercy of those with power over them. We also protect minors from abuse by their parents or others, in various ways. This is one argument for protections for women. And I think we are right to protect racial minorities, especially those who are at the same time less populous, powerful, and affluent than others.

Putting these two principles together, we have our first ethical conflict. That is, if a difference is morally inferior but weaker, should it be protected (as weaker), or not (as less good)? I think the moral dimension takes precedence over the power dimension. That is, good should always be encouraged, and bad should always discouraged, even when there is a power differential. But where there is moral equivalence (the difference doesn’t carry any good or bad moral character), then the power dynamic should be respected, with buffers against abuse by the more powerful, and protections for the less powerful.

Seen in this light, homosexuality (et al) should be discouraged precisely when we believe it is morally wrong (or at least morally worse than heterosexuality), but protected when it is not (i.e., either morally equivalent or better). So the question “is homosexuality (et al) a moral and social deviance …?” is critical to our understanding of the issue. If it is wrong, it should be discouraged. But if it is morally equivalent to heterosexuality, it should be protected.

Similarly, race difference should be discouraged precisely when we believe it is morally wrong/worse, but protected when it is not. Thus the question “Is being black (et al) morally worse than being white (or any other race)?” is critical to our understanding of this issue. If being black is morally worse, then it should be discouraged. But if it is morally equivalent (as I assert), then it should be protected.

But these are the very questions that I never hear discussed or debated in the public sphere. Each side assumes their position, and makes whatever claims they will on the basis of it. But I think until we come to terms with this question, the questions that depend on it will continue in their intractability.

This ethic applies to lots of other questions. For instance, we protect most disabilities precisely because we believe that being disabled is not a moral problem, but a practical one —and one that may leave you less able to defend yourself, no less. We could think of lots of differences that would fit into this logic. On the other hand, we punish crimes precisely because we believe they have a negative moral value —being a criminal is not just another way to live, it is a moral (among others) problem for the individual and others.

So, I’ve come to terms lately that

I am more verbal, detailed, and explicit in my communication than most people. So there will probably be times where you feel I’m excessively explicit, lengthy or detailed in my communication.

But what is the moral value of this difference? Is being more verbal, detailed, or explicit wrong, in some way? Yes, I would say, if that difference is being used to do something which is wrong. If I were to be verbally abusive, I have no doubt that it would hurt worse than other people doing the same thing. But is that typically what is at hand? I get the strong impression that people are hurt by my explicit, lengthy or detailed communication when no hurt is intended. Is that behavior that should be corrected? I see that in other areas of my life (especially in my analysis and writing), these qualities are valued.

I ask the above not because I think the answer is obvious, but because I would love to talk with you about your thoughts on this. I am not above intentionally sinning in my speech or writing, but I assert that this is not typically the case —at least not in most cases where someone has come to me, or where I have noticed a problem and asked them. But you may disagree, and if so, I’d love to talk to you about it. In the mean time,

I ask that you be patient with me when this happens, and let me know. Please believe that I don’t do this to hurt you or to gain some unfair advantage for myself, but because this behavior makes sense from my perspective, and because I don’t always predict correctly when that might be a problem for others.


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